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Abstract 
How can we understand the innovativeness of firms or organizations in general, and how should we assess it in 
terms of nontechnological innovation? My paper deals with these two questions. The “ability” of companies to 
adapt to new circumstances, to create new products, processes and new knowledge, has been conceptualized in 
many approaches. Some of them simply define a list of “(critical) success factors” or “(key) performance indica-
tors”, as tools for ranking and evaluation, without any theoretical reference. Others, like the resource-based or 
capability-based approach(es), work with theoretical references, but are still very weak in operationalizing of 
what they call “capability”. My paper gives a critical description of this situation and offers a new proposal to 
classify and to measure the “inclination” of organizations to innovate in all dimensions. This proposal roots in 
pragmatistic thinking as represented in the theory of reflexive modernization and in the pragmatist version of 







1  Dead Ends of Capability Approaches in Innovation Research 
Assuming that it makes sense to measure innovation or innovativeness, we find the measure-
ment of innovation advanced on the macro and meso level. It is well established for national 
and regional benchmarkings in a policy perspective (for instance by the OECD, by the Euro-
pean Commission with CORDIS, or by the US e.g. with the Massachusetts Index of the Inno-
vation Economy). However, the situation is different on the level of firms, or organizations in 
general. Of course, using output-indicators like patents, the number of new products per year, 
or the turnover-share of new products, is wide-spread. Even more common is the use of out-
come-indicators like ROI or growth (of value, market share, employment). But in the pre-
dominant empiricism, where authors interpret correlations as causality and claim to have iden-
tified the “critical success factors”, causal relations between innovation indicators and per-
formance remain considerably uncertain. And these indicators contain information basically 
about the past. If one wants to assess how firms will probably do in the future, this basis al-
lows only for simple extrapolation.    2
Since the standard view is that markets are becoming more turbulent, and development times 
shorter and shorter, the focus of discussion in management and innovation research shifted 
from traditional performance measurement to the measurement of innovative abilities. And 
that means: more to the input factors for innovation. This happened parallel to a paradigm 
shift in management science from a structural to an action view, from an outside to an inside-
perspective (adaption vs. creation), from a market-orientation to a competence-focus, and 
from the structure-conduct-performance-paradigm of industrial economics to the resource-
conduct-performance-paradigm of the Competence-Based View. Of course, this shift from 
contingency theory to competence theory was necessary, particularly in order to acknowledge 
the role of endogenous forces of change, to understand the increasing importance of knowl-
edge production in modern economies, and to explain performance differences among com-
panies within an industry (the traditional lack of neoclassic market theories). They contrast a 
non-historic economic thought process with an evolutionary (Nelson/Winter 1982) or learning 
theory perspective (see also Wilkens et al. 2004), in which (core) competencies of companies 
are considered long-term, mature bundles of resources and capabilities (path dependency, see 
also Dierickx/Cool 1989). However, in return for this they encounter new gaps and weak-
nesses, some of which I will outline here. 
(1) Internalism (internal determinism)  
First, it leads just into the opposite dead end of contingency theory when observed (or as-
cribed) performance gets generally attributed to internal potentials (competence, ability, 
knowledge, strategy). One single-sightedness is replaced by the other: a view toward the out-
side by one toward the inside, an adaption view by a creation view.  
Is that also true for the Competence Based View (CBV, e.g. Teece et al. 1997) which emerged 
as a Process School from the initial and more static Resource-Based View (RBV) the 1990ies 
(see e.g. Moldaschl/Fischer 2004)? In the CBV, corporate success is no longer explained by 
an optimal fit between corporate strategy and environment, as in the market-based view, but 
rather by innovative actions that constantly create new market imbalances. In principle, it 
does not derive competitive advantage mechanically from the availability of resources, but 
rather from the capability to use them in a meaningful and innovative way. A critical insight, 
which truly only gets down to business with its distinction between resources and services, 
which was already applied by the “ancestor” of resource approaches, Edith Penrose.  
“It is never resources themselves that are the ‘inputs’ in the production process, but only the services that the 
resources can render. (...) The important distinction between resources and services is not their relative dura-
bility; rather it lies in the fact that the resources consist of a bundle of potential services and can, for the most 
part, be defined independently of their use, while services cannot be so defined” (Penrose 1959/1980: 25).  
I quote this well-known passage here again, because it is of key importance for all further 
arguments, for the critical ones as well as for those relating to an alternative concept (Section 
5). In fact, even if the CBV makes a step forward when it activates the concept of “services” 
by capabilities of making use, innovation research on this basis did not yet offer a satisfying 
understanding of the basic dialectics of routine and innovation, as addressed e.g. by Leonard-
Barton (1992). The fact that precisely the successful practices (core competencies) can easily 
turn into “core rigidities”, which are very difficult for organizations to give up. Also Nelson’s 
and Winter’s (1982) routine-focused evolutionary approach fails in this respect. Thus, the 
mechanically positive attribution of competencies as “success factors” replaced the latent re-
source determinism in the RBV.
1 
                                                 
1   “Competence resides in the tacit capability of the firm that results from a process of continued and collective 
learning, and is embodied in the firm’s localised skills and organisational routines” (Cantwell, 1992). “Het-
erogeneous knowledge bases and capabilities among firms are the main determinants of sustained competi-
tive advantage and superior corporate performance” (Eisenhardt/Santos, 2002: 139).   3
(2) Circularity 
This contributes much to the tendency toward tautological explanations.
2 The success (and 
failure) of companies (or persons or nations) is generally traced back to capabilities and their 
combinations. But which of them are superior, however, is only evident ex post, from the 
achieved rents (Porter 1991; Priem/Butler 2001; Foss 2003). The indicators which point on 
superior competences tend to be the proof too. 
What about a company that fails with its innovative product, as happened to many biotech 
companies? Did the company actually have insufficient innovative capability? Or was it lack-
ing marketing competence? Why don’t we then speak about failure capability? Or was it not 
due in any way to internal qualifications, but rather to external conditions (laws, being 
squeezed out by competitors with greater market power, etc.)? Does a company that has satis-
fied employees have satisfaction competence and/or the capacity for gratification, or does it 
perhaps have only unambitious employees?  
(3) The capability to do everything right in the future (empty generalism) 
When Peters und Waterman (1982) introduced their concept of excellence, they had in mind 
something similar to the concept of core competencies: a specific combination of success fac-
tors. Ten years later, the majority of “excellent companies” had dropped off their list (Pascale 
1991: 18f). The problem that one cannot know which core competencies will be in demand in 
the future, has been taken up by countless authors, responding with concepts or labels that 
claim to conceptualize the ability of firms to survive or to be successful in the future.
3  
Thus it is no longer specific competencies that quickly (shall) become obsolete which are now 
considered relevant, but rather a type of meta-competence, a capability to be, to remain or to 
become competent, i.e. to innovate oneself. A universal capability, or capability to develop 
universal capabilities? A capability competence? Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997: 516) define 
their dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal 
and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments” In other words: capa-
bilities for creating capabilities or the capability to be or remain competent. A PerfectAbility - 
an ability to do everything right in the future? The concept of architectural capability meets 
with a similar interpretation today. While Henderson and Clark (1990) had used it to identify 
a capability for combining technological components (with reference to the distinction be-
tween incremental, radical and architectural innovation, i.e. a capability for system innova-
tion), some overexpand it to a capability of combining capabilities (e.g. Stoll/Schäffer 2005).  
Specific skills (knowledge, skills) are seen as neglectible compared with „higher order“ capa-
bilities.
4 This concept is widespread and appears to be plausible. If market conditions con-
tinue to change faster and faster, at the level of individual compentencies, occupations and 
professions need to be replaced by a general capability to change oneself, a capability for life-
long learning, etc. (employability). That would mean: it is no longer necessary to have knowl-
                                                 
2   Even if Barney warned: “Simply because firms that compete in imperfectly competitive product markets 
enjoy above normal returns does not necessarily imply that firms that adopt strategies to create these product 
market imperfections will enjoy above normal returns” (Barney 1986: 1231f.). 
3   Such as “innovation ability” (Witte 1973), „organizational intelligence“ (Wilensky 1967; McMaster 1996) or 
„organizational fitness“ (Beer 2003), „core competence“ (Pralahad/Hamel 1990), “absorptive capacity” 
(Cohen/Levinthal 1990), „architectural capability“ (Henderson/Clark 1990), „combinative capabilities” 
(Kogut/Zander 1992), „strategic change capabilities“ (Pettigrew/Whipp 1993), “dynamic capabilities” (Teece 
et al. 1997), or „knowledge-processing capabilities“ (Jantunen 2005). Others compete newly for attention and 
difference, like „reconfigurability“, “innovative adaptability”, “metaskills” and “metacompetence”, etc. 
4  Higher and higher, following Zollo and Winter (2002: 341): In a “turbulent environment” not only core com-
petencies need to be constantly updated, but also the “...dynamic capabilities and even the higher order learn-
ing approaches will themselves need to be updated repeatedly.”   4
edge and skills, but rather must know where knowledge can be found and how one learns. 
And yet it appears that he already exists: the modern sales expert, who only knows who could 
know something; or the (post)modern truck driver who is no longer able to drive at all, but 
who simply must know how to learn to drive ... A context-free „best ability“-view, analogous 
to best practice-thinking, and resulting in a great mystification or mystificonfusion of abilities.  
(4) Lack of operationalization and studies with methodical rigor  
No wonder that these meta-competences and universal capabilities are difficult to operational-
ize. Hence, we find a predominance of case studies with descriptive plausibility with obscure 
or simple operationalizations. As an example, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) define their fa-
mous and citation-striking absorptive capacity as “…the ability of a firm to recognize the 
value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (ibid.: 
129). And how do they operationalize it? Just by a single variable: R&D expenditures, in 
comparison to the overall expenditures. The greater the share in R&D expenditure, so goes 
the assumption, the greater the absorptive capacity. No one will dispute the fact that this as-
pect of investment reveals something about the firm's chances in the future. The OECD and 
the EU Commission use the same indicator for regions and nations. But why does one need a 
capability concept for this? According to this logic, firms with high personnel costs would 
have to have a high level of personnel capability or Human Resources Capacity. That would 
almost make more sense if we attributed a high defensive (or aggressive) capacity to compa-
nies with above-average attorney and court costs.  
If this and other concepts just avoid to discuss these questions by very formal indicators, oth-
ers “solve” the problem just by asking the managers whether they/their company has high 
competences or dynamic capabilities (e.g. Pavlou/Sawy 2005).  
2  Institutional Reflexivity as a Dynamic Capability? 
As a conclusion, I want to propose a conception that examines the innovativeness of organiza-
tions (a) without any reference to concepts of (cap)abilitiy. (b) It prefers observable, objectifi-
able indicators (captured by observation, document analysis, condition-focussed interviews ) 
for innovative or innovation-friendly routines, (c) which are understood as institutionalized 
practices or rules (why it can be labelled as rule-centered). The focus lies (d) on the contribu-
tion of reflexive practices to innovativeness and innovation performance, (e) addressing all 
dimensions of innovation (technical, organizational, financial, social, cultural). And finally, it 
does not claim to cover all relevant aspects of the innovation process; instead (f), it explicitly 
offers a selective focus on institutionalized practices of making use of resources (intellectual, 
social, technical, …), not analyzing the resources themselves, thus being designed for a com-
plementary analysis of resources for innovation. In my view, this is the prerequisite for inte-
grative studies of cycles of resources and use, understood as institutional learning. 
The conception of “Institutional Reflexivity” focuses on the question, how firms keep their 
procedures and premises open to revisions, and which institutions they impede “lock-ins”. 
One could perhaps label these institutions also as “dynamic capabilities”, if wishing to em-
phasize their resource character. But that’s precisely what I want to avoid here. The concept 
grew out, theoretically, of modernization theories and pragmatistic theories of organizational 
learning. And, practically, out of the strange observation that firms invest so much time and 
money in change and innovation projects, and so little interest and willingness in an evalua-
tion of the experiences and outcomes without reservations. We interpret this as part of the 
enormous hysteresis or inertia in organizational change, as it can regularly be observed (also 
in our research and consulting projects). We found it evident that it was by no means only the   5
particularly successful practices that were sifted out in unreflective routines. Some rules had 
not simply become inadequate, but appeared to be more or less dysfunctional at all times, like 
restrictions of direct communications between departments and status groups.  
Although we are surrounded everywhere by modernization rhetoric, which makes everything 
“fluid”, disposable, in need of justification and revisable, i.e. “reflexive” within the meaning 
of the theory of reflexive modernization (see also Beck/Bonß 2001, for example), we consis-
tently have experiences to the contrary in organizations (and in our own daily lives). Rules 
and interpretations are maintained, actively defended or virtually immunized against “falsify-
ing” influences and realizations. If we want to adequately describe and understand organiza-
tional modernization, we must be able to carry this out to the same extent when it comes to 
change and persistence.  
The term reflexivity has been widely disseminated in many social-scientific discourses and 
essentially stands for “modern” mechanisms of change; either, as with Ulrich Beck, for mis-
understood modifying repercussions of social activities of this itself, or for a more or less con-
scious processing of the consequences of action in terms of learning. I am referring to two 
aspects here when I mention institutional reflexivity: 
•  As a social phenomenon or as a feature of organizational practice, it is interesting as to 
how organizations observe themselves, analyze the consequences of actions and change 
their rules. It is interesting how they do that, and which rules and/or institutions they create 
for this purpose. 
•  As an analytical concept, it provides suitable criteria for observation and evaluation by 
means of which the level of institutional non-learning (“innovation barriers”) can be evalu-
ated, or vice versa, the institutional willingness and capability of the organization (“dy-
namic capability”), to continuously examine the routines and orientations in use (theories-
in-use).  
2.1  Reflexivity as a characteristic of modernization processes  
Modernization theories have described the duplication of possibilities to act and thus of re-
quirements for making decisions as a general trend of modern times, encoded them with terms 
such as “functional differentiation” (Luhmann), “multi-option society” (Gross) or “reflexive 
modernization” (Beck, Giddens). The number of practical and cognitively available design 
solutions and rationalization strategies in which decisions are “rendered as not taken for 
granted/non-obvious” are also on the rise in the world of organizations. If the number of op-
tions increases, so does the contingency, i.e. the reciprocal conditionality of design decisions. 
At the same time, their outcomes are thus more difficult to predict. Instead of unfolding more 
or less “naturally” along practices that have been handed down, the rationalization process 
becomes increasingly bound to justification or “reflexive”, as was pointed out most clearly by 
Ulrich Beck (1986, 1996). It is the hallmark of the modern: tradition (no longer) has any va-
lidity, if it cannot be rationally justified and thus legitimized. In principle at least nothing is 
excluded from the duty of justification and the possibility of revision. 
Of course the category of reflexivity stands for two contrary meanings. On one hand, it stands 
for the old optimism of enlightenment (expansion of rationality). On the other hand, for the 
uncontrollability of the consequences of an increase in rationality and modernization (pessi-
mism of control). Entwined around these meanings is not only the controversy of Beck, Gid-
dens and Lash (1994), but also the entire organizational/theoretical debate. My thesis is as 
follows: the category of reflexivity can only be made useful for organizational/theoretical 
analyses if it integrates these partially conflicting meanings in a dialectic manner.    6
(1) The first meaning is that of self-reference: the organization as a social system observes 
and creates itself. This meaning particularly highlights the organizational theory as proposed 
by Luhmann. The fact that social systems generate and organize themselves, i.e. are not con-
trolled from the outside, is the paradigmatic basic assumption of this theory, which would 
make it tautological at least in its tradition, when speaking of reflexive self-production. The 
reflexive aspect can be found in the concept of the Self. Of course it is conceived as being 
completely without a subject in this case, as a system concept, which describes the repercus-
sions of a system output on the system itself (as in an “autopoietic" chemical reaction). The 
natural sciences have two concepts that fittingly characterize this relation: reference to self 
and recursivity. Surprisingly enough, Ortmann also uses this notion of reflexivity a lot in his 
texts, although he mainly makes reference to Giddens (see below). As is well known, both the 
system theory and the micro-political organizational theory are extremely critical of rational-
ity and skeptical of control. Our differentiation shows that while the production of the organi-
zation principally refers to itself, it is not necessarily reflexive in terms of the following two 
meanings.  
(2) The second meaning emphasizes secondary consequences of goal-oriented action. A proc-
ess is therefore reflexive if it actively takes on and processes the secondary consequences of 
actions that have a (recursive) effect on it. Beck in particular tends to accentuate the aspect of 
systematic secondary consequences when using the term “reflexivity” (modernization proc-
esses react to it, without the players having to cognitively reflect it). From this perspective, 
every “solution” is also concurrently presented as a “problem“, and attention is geared toward 
the paradoxical, contra-intentional effects of players’ strategies.
5 
(3) The third meaning of the term “reflexivity” is associated with the category of knowledge. 
In many contexts it is the only meaning used and understood more or less cognitively. For 
Giddens (1990), the most prominent representative of this semantics, reflexivity is the essen-
tial feature of modernity. In the form of the “reflexive monitoring of action” it is omnipresent, 
since the complexity of modern communities virtually no longer allows for traditional, routine 
activities.
6 For every possible action and for every current solution there are alternatives, each 
with a unique opportunity and risk profile, among which one has to choose on the basis of 
knowledge and by means of calculation. 
Self-reference Side-effects  Knowledge  Dependence  Reflexivity (integrative) 
 Feedback of system 
output to the system, 
e.g. of communications 
to a communication sys-
tem (recursivity)  
 
 
 Subjectivity & insight 
not required  




 Examples: oscillating 
 Unintentional and possi-
bly undesirable conse-





 No insight required; but 
possible  
 Basis: unrecognized 




 Necessity of knowledge-






 Insight and knowledge 
required 
 Basis: complexity, 
breaking away from tra-
dition; ability to make 
things non-routine  
 
 Being aware of the 
conditions of our own 
knowledge and the lack 
of straightforwardness 
of consequences of ac-
tions in complex sys-
tems 
 Insight constitutive; 
Subject required 
 Basis: experience of 
embedding; expertise; 
willingness to criticize 
self  
 
                                                 
5   One of the noted analysts of paradoxical effects in the field of organizational research is Perrow (1984), who 
stand out for his verification of insecurity by means of safety strategies that increase complexity.  
6   Giddens’ understanding of modernization basically conflicts with that of Beck. While Giddens feels that the 
essence of modernization (i.e. from the beginning on) consists of increasing reflexivity, Beck ascribes it in 
his diagnosis of a change of form within the modernization process only in the latter part of the 20





 Examples: getting fat 




 Examples: shopping in 
environment of wide va-
riety of goods; eating in 
times of Genefood; se-
lection of consultants 
 Example: 360 degree 
feedback; (voluntary) 
supervision methods;  
 risk communication  
 
Table 1: Three common encodings of reflexivity and a proposal for integration  
(4) One would then either need to constantly explain which meaning one is referring to when 
speaking of a reflexive practice, or one can – and this is what I suggest – define reflexivity in 
a more exacting and “more exclusive” way, by consolidating the three connotations (Table 1). 
More exclusive means that a practice must feature more than one of the characteristics in or-
der to call it reflexive. If recursivity only denotes a repeated reaction, then reflexivity denotes 
an understanding of it. It has to do with the applied effective awareness of an (individual or 
collective) practice of its systematic embeddings and the inability to know the results of ac-
tions. This mode of consciousness is not only critical in terms of a request for rational justifi-
cation, but also in reference to itself, i.e. self-critical in the sense of not hiding its own prereq-
uisites and limits. It is then perhaps reflexive in terms of being self-referencing and self-
clarifying when the media reports about how the media reports about politics. Or when the 
history of the science of history is written.  
These designations can refer to Action, Knowledge and Learning. Reflexive Action is there-
fore acting in the consciousness of one’s own situation and of the problem of secondary con-
sequences. The antagonist of this wide-ranging rationality is a rational mode of thinking and 
acting, which is always inclined to arrive at the wrong conclusion by taking the high-speed 
line of thinking without any detours. And reflexive knowledge is knowledge about this knowl-
edge itself (knowledge of the second order).  
Which of the three mentioned courses of reflexivity a certain practice takes, which one in 
general and to what extent, whether a process is only recursive or is also reflexive in terms of 
our “three-dimensional” definition, can only be determined empirically. It is not recom-
mended, therefore, to follow Anthony Giddens in this respect. Reflexivity has surely in-
creased in his sense during the process of modernization, both from an individual and institu-
tional perspective, but there is certainly no omnipresence as a result of complete implementa-
tion. We must assume that reflexivity is, firstly, constantly being covered by new routiniza-
tions, like a clearing in the jungle is covered by exuberant growth. This is the basic dialectic 
of “effective innovation”. Secondly, that reflexivity is situated: its extent and quality depend 
on context. The concept is incompatible with context-free assumptions like: The more reflex-
ivity, the more innovation, or success.  
2.2 Analysis  of  institutional reflexivity  
Applying institutional reflexivity as an analytical concept thus implies evaluating manage-
ment concepts and organizational methods in accordance with the extent to which they gener-
ally, i.e. depending on opportunity, promote absorptive capacity for findings which contribute 
to the revision or innovation of previous points of view and practices.
7 Organizational bodies 
of rules or practices that do precisely that can therefore be characterized as reflexive institu-
tions, or in fact as institutionalized reflexivity. How can we now determine the extent of insti-
tutional reflexivity in organizations? I will outline this in three steps: (1) a definition of crite-
ria, (2) standards of evaluation and (3) contextualization.  
                                                 
7  absorptive capacity, on the other hand, means more and less: more, because it also pertains mainly to new 
technological or market knowledge; less, because the question of revision is not posed systematically.    8
(1) Capturing potentially reflexive institutions: Criteria  
The following five criteria operationalize the three reflexivity modes. For institutions that 
meet the respective functions, we can assume that they will increase the likelihood of revision 
or innovation of previous perceptions or practices. I will outline them briefly and give a few 
procedures of corporate practice as examples in each case, which can all be put “under suspi-
cion of reflexivity” in advance.  
(a) Institutionalization of self-observation and self-criticism. Which devices within companies 
aid in reflexive monitoring? Insofar as such institutions become topics of discussion in classic 
models of corporate management at all, they are comprised of the governing bodies Top Man-
agement and Supervisory Board. They must design and examine the strategic orientation. 
Over the last several decades, especially in larger companies, more and more entities and pro-
cedures were created for subjecting all of the other ones to regular testing. Departments for 
Social Affairs, Think Tanks, and the like (see below) were added to departments such as Or-
ganizational Development and In-house Consulting. And even controlling departments are 
being integrated into the strategic monitoring process more and more, such as when instru-
ments like the Balanced Scorecard or knowledge statements are to be used to record and re-
manage strategically relevant “intangible assets”. The continuous improvement process can 
also be considered a possible instrument of continuous criticism of practices, e.g. “employee 
evaluation” in the “360° Feedback”. Search and questioning heuristics such as the methods of 
5 Whys or Ishikawa charts also institutionalize the everyday willingness to falsify and prevent 
certain routines, rules, topics or functions from being excluded from criticism a priori. And 
the court jester function – the only reflexive institution of absolutism.  
For example Trumpf, a mechanical engineering company in Württemberg which has the reputation of being 
innovative, explicitly introduced the job of a court jester. The job holder systematically has to take a contrary 
and unpopular position, searching for counter-arguments and disadvantages even in the case of supposedly 
assured views. Assigning the role is a formal process and the job rotates on a yearly basis; in this way, each 
holder of this role is somewhat exonerated of the inevitable risks associated with handing out criticism. The 
Siemens headquarters in Munich had a similar function, but wore the leading figure out as could be expected 
because the person never changed. The function holder met with the same fate as that of a brightly colored 
bird among grey herons: he/she becomes isolated. In a best case scenario, the model was at best only “simply 
reflexive”, because it was not applied to itself.  
(b) Systematic recourse to outside observation. The most well-known import of outside refer-
ence is surely corporate consulting. Revisions are more likely, however, when companies are 
“irritated” by systemic consultants rather than “assured” by expert consultants. With reference 
to Luhmann, others suggest responsiveness as a criterion (openness to the environment and 
sensibility, not to mention “resonance capability”). They thus designate the communicative 
connections with the “outside” and the willingness to accept signals from the player’s envi-
ronment. The probability that their impulses will be processed innovatively will depend 
equally on the extent of institutionalized self-criticism. Also associated with this is, among 
other things, the analysis of customer complaints, the cooperation with critics (up to the point 
of their “purchase”)
8, round tables, mutual hospitation, the use of boundary spanners (e.g. 
Endres/Wehner 1995; Duschek et al. 2001). Benchmarking functions without internalizing, to 
a certain extent at a distance, and often treats the perspectives and practices of others as a 
black box, or – for lack of knowledge – must treat them so. In this form, I therefore assign it 
to the fourth criterion.  
                                                 
8   The “purchase” of critics need not necessarily be assessed as a measure of immobilization or “symbolic poli-
tics”. The fact that the German Shell AG, for instance, hired the former Senator for the Environment of 
Hamburg after the Brent Spar-affair can also be interpreted as the internalization of critical competence and 
– together with others – as an indicator of a revision of corporate politics.    9
(c) Communicative allusion to external reference. By that I mean the external referential 
“forms of self-representation” as outlined by Luhmann (1984). Within a corporate context, 
this is on one hand about reporting practices in reference to anticipated or experienced exter-
nal perceptions, i.e. not simply advertising as the intentional production of an image, but 
rather, about an examination of external images in a way that refers to the interpretation 
model of others. That is: communication about communication in the “environment”, oriented 
as communication about communication “outward”. On the other hand, accountability in a 
narrower sense is also addressed, that is the more or less obligatory reporting of a company 
requested from “outside” (in contrast to internal reporting, or accounting). This includes not 
only the required documentation (e.g. on toxic emissions), i.e. institutionalized reflexivity in 
legal form, but also other types of reporting extending beyond this, such as environmental 
reports and Corporate Social Reporting (CSR, see below).  
(d) Open evaluation of the consequences of action (sensitivity). If the first and second criteria 
concern the creation of feedback channels, then the fourth pertains to the creation of content. 
It pertains to all types of evaluation of activities for other players and the “environment”, pro-
vided that includes secondary consequences and is not limited only to the (purposeful) meas-
urement of deviations from specified target criteria. An initial sorting criterion for the premo-
nition of reflexivity results in the question of whether evaluation is only about efficiency or 
whether it also encompasses effectiveness, i.e. the possibility of criteria and objective revi-
sion. This rarely applies to evaluations in the university sector, for example. Benchmarking on 
the other hand is one of those true “key elements” of the evaluation explosion. Companies us 
it to definitively “measure” their performance and practices compared to competitors, but also 
in areas where there is no competition, so as to initiate it or imitate it in those instances. Com-
panies thereby create competition by location, and for public establishments, benchmarking in 
the New Public Management is the main tool for creating pressure for rationalization and 
other changes. For Giddens, this in itself would be reflexive. Benchmarking would only as-
sess a more challenging version in this way if, alongside direct economic target criteria, em-
bedding aspects (e.g. social and ecological parameters) were also being evaluated. In actual 
fact, in addition to profit, per-person sales or growth, the “soft factors” are being used increas-
ingly in comparative measurements, such as customer relationship management and customer 
satisfaction or innovative capacity. Similar surveying procedures, such as customer question-
naires, are of course being used as well and for the most part independently, and are inte-
grated into the Balanced Scorecard (see below) in other ways, for example. This is another 
reason why assigning concrete procedures to the criteria is not unrelated to context.  
(e) If the return of uncertainty is a characteristic of the late modern period, then accentuating 
not-knowing and the outlining of alternative presences and futures are strategic replies by the 
companies. If they make the growing number of options for taking action, the conditions and 
consequences of which cannot be overlooked, easier to process with scenario techniques and 
similar procedures, this can be called strategic optionalization (or even perspectivation). Pro-
cedures which institutionalize such things, i.e. put them on a continuing basis and disassociate 
them from the disposition of individual persons, include but are not limited to the following: 
systematic changes in duties, roles, departments and company and also parallel development 
teams;  Japanese firms are considered particularly active in this regard (see also e.g. 
Nonaka/Takeuchi 1995). We might also include creativity techniques such as role play (e.g. 
the Six Hat Method by Bono, 1989). These are also basically decentralizing rules, as in crite-
ria 1 and 2.  
(2)  Evaluating reflexive practices    10
All these practices can be observed or surveyed easily by standardized surveys. But it is clear 
that we cannot consider them on their own or primarily as measures for increasing (institu-
tional) reflexivity. It is an aspect, a possible function. A company with a department for or-
ganizational development, which pursues organizational innovations in an engineering ration-
ality, has certainly institutionalized a change organization, but not necessarily reflexivity. And 
vice versa, many procedures in specific implementations have nothing reflexive about them. 
Just to mention Management by Objectives (MbO), which is more likely to be translated as 
“Management by Oktroy” rather than found as reflexive negotiation of objectives and re-
sources. Or controlling: it can also be virtually anything, from the embodiment of the belief in 
controllability and fiction of rationality to the central instance of reflexivity in companies. In 
order to evaluate the extent to which the identified practices warrant this, adequate quantifica-
tion is required. I have already mentioned a few possibilities for this in passing. The following 
are to be considered: 
(a) The number of channels for feedback and the degree of feedback (in the quantitative di-
mension of ‘recursivity’). 
(b) The reach and/or the objective and time-based horizon of long-range effects (in the quali-
tative dimension of ‘secondary consequences’). Which players and systems with respect to 
which consequences in which spaces and time periods are included in monitoring? 
(c) Revision of criteria and objectives: to what extent are these provided for and permissible 
in the self-evaluations? Which measures and objectives are actually being assessed and 
which ones are made taboo? 
(d) The degree of applying or abandoning reflexive rules or procedures. Does environmental 
monitoring have any consequences at all? And if it does, what significance does it have in 
the decision-making process?  
(e) Self-application: to what extent is the respective test or distancing procedure applied to 
itself? To what extent does it become an object of the testing and revision itself (e.g. as an 
evaluation of the evaluation)? To what extent are failed measures learned, and to what ex-
tent are they displaced? 
Which type of quantification is selected (ordinal, dichotomy, etc.) will have to be decided on 
a case-by-case basis. At any rate, not all could be captured by standardized interviews without 
studying experts. 
(3) Contextualizing institutional reflexivity  
The two steps outlined here provide information on the ‘what’ and the ‘how much’ of institu-
tional reflexivity, but no assessment of its context suitability. As little as perhaps determining 
the skilled worker portion of a labor force. Whether a company needs a lot or a little reflexiv-
ity also depends on the context. Why, for example, should one evaluate the organization of 
garbage collection primarily on the basis of enabling organizational innovation? Arguably, if 
need be, with regard to the collection of toxic materials, where the type of material constantly 
changes. After all, we do not measure the function of a lawn mower by means of its accelera-
tion from zero to one hundred, or the efficiency of a cleaning crew on the basis of the patents 
that it has applied for based on its expertise.  
Moreover, the above criteria do not provide any normative evaluation from a corporate stand-
point to be defined. In the same way that social capital is not good per se (it is mostly dis-
cussed as the glue of bourgeois society, and not as a bonding agent of parasitic collectives 
such as the Mafia or certain functional elites), reflexivity is not good per se. More so even 
than Beck, for whom reflexivity initially consists in good intentions becoming obsolete due to   11
the bad secondary consequences, reflexivity in Giddens’ view appears as the all-embracing 
assurance of discourse and democratization. If, however, Deutsche Bank revises its foreign-
referenced self portrayal and no longer announces its dismissal operations at the same time as 
its record profits – who else benefits from that other than its shareholders? For this reason as 
well, it cannot be a matter of “the more, the better” when it comes to evaluating reflexivity. A 
third argument, on the other hand, is that organizations (as well) must find a balance between 
learning and routine, irritation and confirmation, and therefore change and stability. The de-
bate on organizational learning demonstrates this in particular. 
3 Summary   
Can the indicators of Institutional Reflexivity be used as “indicators for innovation the 21
st 
century” on the organizational level? To answer the question practically: In the context of the 
audit explosion, many of the indicators defined here are already produced in practice. Not 
only to measure innovativeness, but also to benchmark performance, and to assess the side-
effects of economic action. In the conception of Institutional Reflexivity they get integrated 
and added. What can we do with it as an indicator system?  
(1) Of course, the study of relations between Institutional Reflexivity and innovation perform-
ance might be the obvious and „standard“-application. Yet, the approach has only been ap-
plied in industry case studies (just as we criticized as prevailing in the CBV-practice). A 
quantitative project will start next year (2) Beyond that, we also can use it to study the sensi-
tivity of organisations (e.g. in governance studies) with respect to stakeholders, environment, 
or market reputation, i.e. to assess how firms deal with “externalities”.
9 In both applications, it 
can and should be used in combination with a resource-oriented analysis. The procedures how 
to allow e.g. for creativity do not measure the existing and applied amount of creativity, 
equally with respect e.g. to the level of trust between innovation actors. (3) A third application 
is the critical conceptual analysis of existing management-tools with respect to their “capac-
ity” to support (or impede) reflexivity and learning in organizations (e.g. Intellectual Capital 
Measuring, Human Resources Controlling). That’s what we are actually doing in a project, 
with recommendations for tools and application modes for practitioners. Finally (4) it can be 
used (and we use it) in action research projects and consulting as an instrument for diagnosis 
and participative design. 
Using the analytical perspective of ‘institutional reflexivity’, we can describe and evaluate 
institutional requirements for the convertibility of corporate structures and cultures, which are 
coded elsewhere as capabilities. But a “the more...the better” logic belongs to success factor 
research. The assumption of superiority in principle cannot be justified. This contradicts the 
concept of reflexivity itself, in particular that of self-application. Empirical findings also proof 
that, such as those of the early experimental institutional economics. Heiner (1986) or Giger-
enzer, for example, show that the blind application of rules in circumstances of a high level of 
uncertainty delivers greater hit rates and profits than knowledge-based flexible strategies. We 
know this also as the “housewife effect” in stock exchange events. More complex knowledge 
implies more sources of error: “More information generally leads to more uncertainty” (Mi-
chael 1996). And finally, legitimating facades as defined by Meyer and Rowan (1977), which 
to a certain extent can be interpreted as a segregation from reflexivity, nevertheless safeguard 
the organizational decision-making processes outwardly and inwardly, stabilize reciprocal 
behavioral expectations and are therefore “functional” in various respects. Context matters. 
                                                 
9 Empirical texts can be found on our homepage: www/tu-chemnitz.de/wirtschaft/bwl9   12
In addition, with all the acceleration in technological development, generation of knowledge 
and globalization, companies ultimately do not sell the capacity to change (except perhaps for 
a few consultants), but rather this or that product or service. The concept of institutional re-
flexivity already has a built-in brake against maximization thought. The question is only how 
organizations make sure in every area of their activity whether their practices are still appro-
priate for the situation, or whether routines in relation to the meaning of established rules have 
already become blind and only justify themselves in a self-referential manner anymore. The 
remaining paradox is the desire to institute meta-rules against the locking-in-place of rules, 
and methods of thinking against the blindness of thinking methods. But the paradox is a prac-
tical one, not an academic-circular one. 
The task of a concept of institutional reflexivity is therefore to justify (a) both the necessity 
and (b) the limits of necessity of organizational self-observation and self-surveying in various 
contexts. In addition, (c) assumptions must be developed about the conditions under which to 
evaluate the “rendering as special” of reflexive functions as meaningful, dangerous or am-
bivalent, that is, their functional separation from the everyday practices. And finally, it must 
provide (d) observation criteria, by means of which the degree and quality of reflexive action 
as well as its suitability with respect to the requirements to be reconstructed can be empiri-
cally evaluated (criteria for the observation of self-observation). With reference to observa-
tions of the first order, the perspective of institutional reflexivity becomes a design perspec-
tive, with respect to observations of the second order (observation of the observer), it is or 
remains an analytical perspective. With reference to science (self-observation of the observer, 
or self-application), the difference does not disappear, but loses some of its sharpness.  
And finally, we must not forget the “fuzzy relationship” between the description of organiza-
tional arrangements as rules or as resources (capabilities, capacities, etc.). They can be re-
garded more calmly if we remain aware of the imagery of the competence attributions.  
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